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Abstract—We demonstrate that an interferer with malicious
intentions can significantly degrade the performance of impulse-
radio (IR) ranging. The cicada attack we have developed can
decrease the distance (degradation of service) measured by rang-
ing algorithms designed to cope with weak NLOS conditions; it
can also jam communication (denial of service). The attack is easy
to mount and can be effective even against receivers designed to
cope with benign multi-user interference. We also sketch possible
countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
A distinguishing feature of IR-UWB is the ability to perform
high-precision ranging in multipath environments and/or under
interference. This makes IR-UWB an ideal candidate for
implementing services such as indoor localization, tracking, or
physical access control. Thanks to the fine timing resolution
of IR-UWB, even low-cost energy detectors (EDs) are able to
achieve sub-meter ranging precision in weak non-line-of-sight
(NLOS) conditions: A receiver can first lock onto the strongest
multipath component, and afterwards perform a back-search to
find the first arriving path [1], [2]. As recent works [3], [4],
[5] show, this can be achieved even under interference from
benign users (multi-user interference (MUI)). However, many
of the envisioned applications of IR-UWB ranging are security
sensitive, and we cannot help but ask the question: What could
an interferer with malicious intentions do?
We identify a simple and destructive attack that we call
the cicada attack. It unfolds as follows: Consider two IR
transceivers, T and R, performing ranging. T transmits a
preamble that allows R to acquire the packet and estimate the
time of arrival (ToA). The preamble commonly consists of a
sequence of pulses created by spreading a predefined preamble
code (Fig. 1a). Meanwhile, a malicious device M transmits
constantly a sequence of pulses (Fig. 1b), reminiscent of the
cicada song. Both signals propagate through the multipath
environment and interfere at R (Fig. 1c). If M ’s signal is
stronger than T ’s, R will lock onto the former, and T ’s packet
will be ignored, resulting in denial of service. If M ’s signal
is weaker than T ’s, R will lock on T ’s signal, but there is
a good chance that the back-search algorithm will incorrectly
find the “fist arriving path” in the signal of M (Fig. 1d). The
estimated distance is then significantly lower than the actual
one, resulting in degradation of service.
The cicada attack is very easy to mount. It needs only an
unsophisticated IR transmitter that is not much more energy-
consuming than a benign IR transmitter, and it does not
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Fig. 1. The cicada attack. (a) Benign transmitter T sends a preamble derived
from a preamble code [−1, 0, 1,−1, 0, 0, 1, 1, . . .]. (b) Attacker M transmits
a cicada signal. (c) Both signals propagate through the multipath environment
before they are received by R. (d) R aggregates the received signal over a
number of pulses, and finds the strongest path (1). It then searches back for
the first path (2), but instead finds the bogus path introduced by M (3).
require the knowledge of the preamble code. In contrast,
the consequences of the cicada attack are severe. It can
effectively achieve denial of service against ranging and data
communication (even when secret spreading codes are used).
Degradation of service applies only to ranging, but it is more
subtle and harder to detect, which can make it more dangerous
in some cases. For example, consider a robot-operated factory,
in which robots rely on IR ranging for navigation. A denial
of service attack can be detected instantly, and the robots can
stop on the spot rather than roam around blindly. Under a
degradation of service attack, the robots still obtain distance
measurements, but incorrect ones. Acting upon this false input,
the robots can run into walls, each other, or other equipment,
causing significant property damage.
In the rest of the paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of
the cicada attack. We do this for the IEEE 802.15.4a PHY [6],
but the attack applies to a large class of IR-UWB systems.
We evaluate a basic ED, and two EDs implementing state-
of-the-art MUI-mitigation techniques for synchronization: the
min filter [3], [4] and PICNIC [5], as such techniques could
potentially thwart malicious interference created by our attack.
We show that for all three receivers, the attack can reach close
to 100% degradation, as well as virtually 100% denial with
moderate energy costs. We then outline possible countermea-
sures and directions for future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Packet Format
We consider the mandatory low pulse repetition frequency
(LPRF) mode of the IEEE 802.15.4a PHY [6]. Packets consist
of a synchronization preamble (SYNC), followed by a start
frame delimiter (SFD) and payload. The latter two are of lesser
importance to our investigation; we refer the reader to [6]
for details. The SYNC is constructed from Npsym preamble
symbols of duration Tpsym. A preamble symbol consists of
Npcode code symbols of duration Tpcode. A code symbol
contains a single pulse of polarity, determined by a ternary
preamble code Ck , k = 1, . . . , Npcode. The transmitted signal
is:
s(t) =
Npsym∑
j=1
Npcode∑
k=1
Ckp(t− kTpcode − jTpsym) (1)
where p(t) is the pulse shape of a single pulse. In the manda-
tory LPRF IEEE 802.15.4a mode Npsym = 64, Npcode = 31
and Tpcode = 128ns. We use preamble code 5.
B. Receivers
We consider EDs composed of an antenna, a 500MHz band-
pass filter, followed by a squaring device and an integrator. The
integrator outputs a discrete time sample ym every Tint = 2ns.
We evaluate three receivers: a classical ED (termed Vanilla),
and two EDs robust to MUI: MINF and PICNIC. All receivers
operate in stages: a) coarse synchronization to acquire the
packet and determine the strongest multipath component, b)
fine synchronization to determine the ToA by finding the first
multipath component, c) channel estimation, d) SFD detection,
and e) data demodulation. The last 3 stages use standard
algorithms, or (in case of MINF and PICNIC) versions robust
to MUI [7].
a) Coarse Synchronization: For Vanilla and MINF,
coarse synchronization follows the baseline method from [5].
Essentially, the incoming ym samples are correlated with a
binary template formed from NG = 16 preamble symbols
for processing gain. The maximum correlator output sample
corresponds to the strongest path.
In the PICNIC coarse synchronization [5], a PID (power
independent decision) filter is applied to the ym samples before
correlation. Samples below (above) a noise-based threshold
are set to 0 (1), to limit the effect of high-power interferers.
Further, the signal is inspected for presence of a benign
interferer using an alternative preamble code (e.g., code 6 [6]),
and if detected, interference cancelation (IC) is applied.
b) Fine Synchronization: All receivers perform a back-
search [1], [2] in a window of duration TBS = 64ns preceding
the sample containing the strongest path. The ToA is identified
as the first sample i in this window that is 1) above a threshold
and 2) greater than sample i + TpcodeTint (one code symbol
later). The second test mitigates “self-interference”: With non-
coherent reception, autocorrelation of the preamble code is
always strictly positive [5], which creates secondary peaks in
the correlator output (repeating every code symbol). The self-
interference test (SIT) proposed in 2) relies on these peaks
being strictly smaller than the main correlation peak.
Vanilla and PICNIC perform the back-search on the corre-
lator output, with appropriate noise-based thresholds. MINF
[3], [4] uses an average of an equivalent number of code
symbols, filtered with a moving min filter before averaging
(min-window length Wmin = 8). The min filter removes
interference based on the assumption that the interference is
present in at most Wmin−1 consecutive code symbols (typical
for MUI).
III. ATTACK
A. Threat Model
We assume that an attacker deploys a cicada device, M ,
in an area where benign devices perform ranging. The cicada
device constantly transmits a cicada signal of the following
structure:
m(t) =
∞∑
j=−∞
Np·Npcode∑
k=1
Ajp(t− k
Np
Tpcode − jTpsym) (2)
where Np is the number of (uniformly spaced) pulses trans-
mitted per code symbol, and Aj is a periodic binary sequence
that determines when the cicada device remains silent. Note
that the start time and duration of silent periods are multiples
of the preamble symbol duration Tpsym, rather than Tpcode –
this mitigates the min filter. We use the abbreviation i-attack to
denote an attack with Np = i. We call the attack continuous if
Aj = 1 and intermittent if Aj = 1 for j a multiple of 3, and 0
otherwise. A more general signal structure can be envisioned,
but this format is sufficient for our purposes.
The attacker can adjust Na and Aj , as well as the trans-
mission power, and the location of the cicada device. We will
mostly focus on an attacker interested in degradation, rather
than denial of service.
B. Performance Evaluation
Setup. We assume that a receiver R is exposed to the cicada
signal at signal-to-noise ratio SNRM. R receives, at random
times, ranging packets transmitted by a benign transmitter
T with SNRT. (In both cases, the SNR is defined as EpN0 ,
where Ep is the energy of a single pulse.) We simulate
the entire packet reception process (from synchronization to
demodulation). We use the residential (weak) NLOS channel
model [8].
Metrics. We consider that denial occurs if a packet is
not received correctly (failure of coarse synchronization, SFD
detection, or data demodulation). If the packet is received
correctly, degradation occurs if the estimated ToA is at least
2Tint = 4ns below the actual ToA. We measure the percentage
of packets subject to degradation or denial.
Attack performance. The main factor determining the
attack performance is SNRM. This can be seen in Fig. 2a,
which shows the continuous 1-attack performance against the
Vanilla receiver at SNRT = 20dB. From SNRM ≈ −2dB
degradation begins, and it reaches its maximum of around
70% for SNRM ≈ 15dB. 100% is not reached: With Np =
1, the cicada signal, even though spread by the channel
(Fig. 1c), is not always present in the search-back window.
Beyond the maximum point, denial starts to take over, and
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Fig. 2. Cicada attack performance at SNRT = 20. DenialSYNC represents failure in coarse synchronization, DenialpostSYNC – failure in subsequence
reception stages. (a) Vanilla (b) MINF and (c) PICNIC under continuous 1-attack, (d) PICNIC under intermittent 1-attack.
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Fig. 3. Cicada attack performance: degradation. (a) Vanilla under continuous 1-attack, (b) MINF (c) PICNIC under intermittent 2-attack, (d) PICNIC under
intermittent 8-attack.
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Fig. 4. Cicada attack performance: denial. (a), (d) as in figure Fig. 3.
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Fig. 5. ToA error under degradation. (a) continuous 1-attack at SNRT =
20dB (b) intermittent 2-attack at SNRT = 30dB.
for SNRM ≈ 22dB, it reaches 100% – partially due to
coarse synchronization failure (DenialSYNC), and partially due
to failure of subsequent reception stages (DenialpostSYNC).
We observe a similar attack performance for the MINF and
PICNIC receivers (Fig. 2b,c). Both methods were designed
with benign interference in mind but, as expected, neither can
prevent the attack. In case of the MINF receiver, this is because
the min filter cannot remove the cicada signal present in every
code symbol. Degradation is less pronounced than for Vanilla,
but only because of a more conservative back-search threshold
(inherent to MINF). In the case of the PICNIC receiver,
the attack persists because the cicada signal rarely triggers
interference cancelation (the cicada signal does not match the
triggering pattern). Denial sets in about 5dB sooner than for
Vanilla, and is due mostly to coarse synchronization failure.
The reason is PID: As soon as SNRM is high enough, samples
containing cicada signal peaks rise above the threshold, and
are converted to 1. After correlation with the binary template,
the output sequence contains a large number (at least Npcode)
spurious maxima. These maxima are equal to the maximum
corresponding to T ’s signal. The latter is hence unlikely to be
found, and coarse synchronization fails.
This suggests that switching to the intermittent attack can
be more effective in achieving degradation against PICNIC.
Indeed, under the intermittent attack the correlator output for
cicada signal peaks is roughly 13 of the maximum, because the
cicada signal is present only in 13 of the preamble symbols.
This is too low to interfere with coarse synchronization, but
it is sufficient to mislead the back-search algorithm. Fig. 2d
confirms this: Degradation prevails over a much wider range
of SNRM. This demonstrates that the attacker can abuse
techniques designed for benign interference mitigation to his
own ends.
We now show the attack performance as a function of both
SNRM and SNRT. For all receivers and attack variants, the
pattern is similar (Fig. 3): degradation occurs in the triangle
between the lines SNRM = αdB and SNRM = SNRT +
βdB (where α and β depend on the attack type and receiver).
Denial occurs above the degradation triangle (Fig. 4), and for
low SNRT (where the system does not work irrespectively of
attacks).
Increasing Np multiplies the number of cicada signal peaks
in the back-search window, and hence improves degradation
performance: For example, at SNRT = 20dB the 2-attack
against Vanilla reaches 80% versus 70% reached by the 1-
attack. Larger values of Np present a trade-off, best visible for
the PICNIC receiver: degradation with a success ratio > 25%
spans wider (in terms of SNRM) for the 2-attack (Fig. 3c) but
the > 90% degradation spans wider for the 8-attack (Fig. 3d).
Interestingly, in contrast to the other two receivers, PICNIC
degradation does not exceed 98%. This is because interfer-
ence cancelation is triggered occasionally, and when it is, it
effectively removes the cicada interference.
Ranging error under degradation. Fig. 5a shows the mean
absolute error (MAE) of the ToA under the continuous 1-attack
(degraded packets only). All receivers exhibit the same trend:
the MAE grows with SNRM. This is expected, as more cicada
signal peaks rise above the back-search threshold. Fig. 5b
shows the ToA for the intermittent 2-attack for SNRT = 30dB.
For PICNIC the MAE levels out around SNRM ≈ 35dB,
whereas for MINF, denial takes over before leveling out can
be observed.
All attacks and receivers exhibit similar behavior, with the
ToA MAE spanning from 24 to 56ns (ranging error of 7 to 17
meters). This error is lower than could be expected – e.g., with
a heavily polluted back-search window, such as under the 8-
attack, one could anticipate MAE close to TBS = 64ns. MAE
is low because of the self-interference test, which neutralizes
a significant number of cicada peaks.
Clock drift. We verify that clock drift below 40ppm (the
largest allowed by IEEE 802.15.4a) does not degrade the attack
performance.
C. Transmission Power and Location
Due to the denial effect of the attack, the closer a victim
receiver is to the cicada device, the shorter its communication
(and ranging) range becomes. Thus, an attacker interested in
degradation of service can place the cicada device in a location
that victim receivers do not visit, and can transmit with
relatively high power. This way, the “pure denial” area close to
the cicada device does not affect victim devices. At the same
time, a relatively large area is covered with a low-power cicada
signal. This increases the number of devices experiencing
degradation, while it retains a decent communication range.
A more costly alternative is to cover an area with a large
number of cicada devices transmitting at low power.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
The simplest way to prevent the degradation attack is to dis-
card fine synchronization and perform ToA estimation based
on the strongest multipath component only. This, however,
degrades the benign case (no attack) performance in weak
NLOS conditions. Furthermore, an alternative reactive attack
could degrade the ranging performance of even such receivers,
both decreasing and increasing the distance. In the reactive
attack, the interfering signal is simply the preamble. The
attacker begins transmitting after it detects the presence of a
benign preamble on the channel. He adjusts the start of trans-
mission such that his preamble arrives tens of nanoseconds
before (or after) the benign preamble and tunes the power
to overshadow the benign preamble. Although this attack is
more sophisticated (it requires a receiver synchronized with
a transmitter, and the knowledge of the preamble code), it is
still feasible.
Another potential countermeasure is a time-hopping pream-
ble, which avoids the periodicity of the IEEE 802.15.4a-like
preambles, exploited by the cicada attack. For this to be effec-
tive, the greatest common factor of the time-hopping intervals
should be as low as possible. We might also detect and filter
out a periodic cicada signal using a Fourier transform.
Finally, in Section III we identified two mechanisms that
limit the effectiveness of the attack – modifying them might
prevent the attack more effectively. The self-interference test
(SIT) could check yi > yi+TpcodeTint
+ C, where C is a noise-
based security margin. PICNIC could apply interference can-
celation (IC) unconditionally (without detection). A prelimi-
nary evaluation reveals that the SIT countermeasure can reduce
degradation to below 10%, but not without a noticeable loss
in benign case ranging performance; whereas unconditional
IC completely prevents degradation and has minor effect
on single-user benign case ranging performance. However,
such countermeasures might be circumventable by a more
sophisticated cicada signal structure. Also, the unconditional
IC countermeasure is likely to degrade performance under
MUI.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have identified a novel attack against IR-UWB that can
significantly degrade the ranging service: the cicada attack.
We have demonstrated it is effective against energy-detection
receivers, even those implementing state-of-the-art MUI mit-
igation techniques. The attack’s applicability is likely much
broader, as it exploits a fundamental difficulty in distinguishing
the signal of interest from interference. Other receiver archi-
tectures are assumably vulnerable, but additional investigations
are required to confirm this. Other directions for future work
include the development and evaluation of countermeasures,
in parallel with an investigation of variants of the attack.
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